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Kenneth Hammond introduced a distinction between coherence and correspondence
criteria of rationality as a tool in the study of judgment and decision-making. This
distinction has been widely used in the field. Yet, as this paper seeks to show, the
relevant notions of coherence and correspondence have been progressively considered
to be too narrow and have undergone non-trivial conceptual changes since their original
introduction. I try to show, first, that the proliferation of conceptualizations of coherence
and correspondence has created confusion in the literature and that appealing to such
notions has not helped to elucidate discussions over the nature of rational judgment
and decision-making. Nevertheless, I also argue for a reframing of the debate. In fact,
what seems to underlie several contemporary appeals to the notions of coherence and
correspondence is best explained in terms of a contrast between what I call rule-based
and goal-based rationality. Whilst these categories do need further refinement, they do
seem to be useful for organizing and understanding research on rational judgment and
decision-making.
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Hammond’s Coherence – Correspondence Distinction
In recent decades, research on judgment and decision-making has witnessed the development
of several diﬀerent approaches to human rationality, which diﬀer in terms of the impor-
tance they attribute to traditional normative models and the adaptiveness of behavior in
the assessment of performance (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
Chater and Oaksford, 2000). Whilst these diﬀerent projects have arguably remained some-
what disconnected, Hammond (1990, 1996) has attempted to remedy this balkanization. To
promote cross-fertilization between diﬀerent lines of research, he ﬁrst tried to outline a frame-
work that could allow him to identify diﬀerent strategies available to us in the study of
human judgment. He introduced a distinction between coherence and correspondence crite-
ria of rationality, where the latter strategy is called correspondence “because it evaluates the
correspondence between the judgment and the empirical fact that is the object of the judg-
ment” (Hammond, 2007, p. 16). Coherence, on the other hand, relates to the ﬁt between
people’s judgments. Speciﬁcally, Hammond (2007, p. 16) deﬁnes coherence as “the consistency
of the elements of the person’s judgment.” According to him, “it is easy to see the diﬀerence
between a judgment that is directed toward coherence – make it all ﬁt together – and one
that is directed toward the correspondence between a judgment and a fact” (Hammond, 2007,
p. 19).
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Armed with this distinction, Hammond tried to make sense
of diﬀerent lines of research in the study of human judgment.
On one extreme, Brunswik’s (1956) research oﬀered a prominent
illustration of work on correspondence. His research focused
entirely on empirical accuracy, which comes down to the corre-
spondence between a judgment and an object. On the other
extreme, Hammond argued that research in the heuristics and
biases tradition provided a paradigmatic example of research on
coherence (Gilovich et al., 2002). Whilst the heuristics and biases
project was motivated by a desire to oﬀer accurate descriptions
of human judgment and decision-making and give insight into
underlying mechanisms and processes, its researchers measured
behavior against a set of normative principles. For example,
subjects are said to violate coherence when they commit the
conjunction fallacy, ranking the conjunctive event A and B as
higher in probability than one of its component events (see, e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Hammond concluded that this
distinction proved useful in categorizing research in the ﬁeld. Yet,
he was aware that, while correspondence refers here to empiri-
cal accuracy, a criterion with which we are all familiar, providing
a speciﬁc characterization of coherence would be a daunting
task.
A Reformed Distinction
Hammond’s coherence – correspondence distinction has been
widely recognized as a useful conceptual tool in the study of
judgment and decision-making (Adam and Reyna, 2005; Mandel,
2005; Newell, 2005; Baron, 2012; Lee and Zhang, 2012; Wallin,
2013). It was also celebrated in 2009 in a special issue of the jour-
nal Judgment and Decision Making. What I want to stress, here, is
that Hammond’s original distinction has not been just adopted,
but also signiﬁcantly adapted in the literature, as the original
concepts of coherence and correspondence have seemed to be too
narrow.
For instance, consider that the distinction has attracted partic-
ular attention from Gigerenzer, Hertwig, and other cognitive
psychologists and evolutionarily behavioral scientists at the
Centre for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition and at the Centre
for Adaptive Rationality. On Hammond’s view, these schol-
ars exemplify research focusing on correspondence. In this
context, Hammond’s distinction was not used to promote cross-
fertilization between diﬀerent research projects. In fact, these
theorists used the distinction to interpret the philosophical
import of their research on fast-and-frugal heuristics and to ques-
tion the normative commitments typically shared in the ﬁeld.
Previous research in the sciences of decision-making had shown
that people often avoid making trade-oﬀs among attributes
(Payne et al., 1993; Gowda and Fox, 2002; Kahneman and
Frederick, 2002). As Gigerenzer (2000, p. 191) put it, compen-
sation is often seen to be “the cornerstone of classical rationality,
assuming that all commodities can be compared and everything
has its price.” While these patterns of behavior seemed irra-
tional to researchers engaged in bias research, heuristics that
violate principles such as compensatoriness and transitivity have
been shown to outperform inferences that do not imply such
violations. Overall, these heuristics seem fast, frugal, and yet
accurate (for some criticisms see, e.g., Bröder, 2000; Newell et al.,
2003), and the resulting behavior has been described as ecologi-
cally rational, viz. adapted to the environment in which humans
act (Rieskamp and Reimer, 2007, p. 273).
Notably, such ﬁndings have been interpreted by appealing to
Hammond’s distinction and as suggesting that greater coherence
does not always imply greater correspondence, and vice versa
(Katsikopoulos, 2009). Moreover, these theorists stress that “the
function of heuristics is not to be coherent” (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999, p. 22), and that it is correspondence that counts for the
assessment of the ecological rationality of people’s behavior.
It appears clear that coherence has been used in a quite broad
sense here, and that the concept has become a rather complex
and heterogeneous mixture, encompassing diﬀerent constituents
such as compensatoriness and transitivity. To some extent, it
should come as no surprise that this notion has been reshaped.
After all, Hammond’s original deﬁnition of coherence as the inter-
nal ﬁt of someone’s judgments was admittedly vague and thus
allowed for quite ﬂexible use. Furthermore, if Hammond’s inten-
tion in introducing the concept of coherence was to characterize
the normative perspective adopted by projects such as that of
heuristics and biases, his focus on how judgments ﬁt together
looks rather narrow, for instance because those theorists were
also interested in assessing decisions, and not only judgments.
In addition, Hammond’s concept of coherence might be of little
help when trying to apply it to diﬀerent and more complex
tasks. While these may be good reasons to ﬁnd Hammond’s
original concept of coherence to be too narrow, we must note
that these broader characterizations of coherence do not bear
much resemblance to Hammond’s original concept. While tran-
sitivity does have to do with coherence in the usual sense of
the word, compensatoriness does not. In fact, some would say
that non-compensatory strategies could be perfectly coherent
as a matter of logical consistency and of coherence of prefer-
ences.
Some scholars have explicitly attempted to redeﬁne the notion
of coherence as coherence between judgments and some rational
principles, moving beyond Hammond’s previous characteriza-
tion in terms of a ﬁt between people’s judgments. For instance,
Newell (2005, p. 11), in an attempt to explicate Hammond’s orig-
inal concept, writes that “human judgment can be evaluated by
the degree to which it coheres with a formal model.” Along
similar lines, Stevens (2008, p. 291) points out that “human judg-
ment can be evaluated by the degree to which it coheres with a
formal model, such as Bayes theorem.” What is evident is that the
concept of coherence has undergone a quite radical conceptual
change.
Changes have been even more radical with regard to
the concept of correspondence. Some authors have preserved
Hammond’s characterization. For instance, Stevens (2008, p. 291)
claims quite clearly that “correspondence refers to the degree
to which decisions achieve empirical accuracy; that is, whether
they reﬂect the true state of the world.” But others have used
the concept of correspondence more broadly, stressing that
“there are multiple correspondence criteria relating to real-world
decision performance” (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 738),
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where these encompass empirical accuracy, speed, frugality,
ﬁtness-maximization, and successful exchanges with others.
These semantic changes do not have to be seen as an over-
sight or as resulting from a lack of care in the application of
Hammond’s original concept. Researchers attempting to amend
Hammond’s concept of correspondence have found the original
characterization to be too narrow. On the one hand, Hammond
(2007, pp. 78–79) identiﬁed empirical accuracy as the hallmark
of adaptive behavior. For instance, he stressed that “the theory
of evolution rests on natural selection, and natural selection—
apparently—rests on fitness, that is, good, accurate empirical
correctness.” Also Brunswik (1956), thought by Hammond to
oﬀer paradigmatic research into correspondence, seemed to high-
light a strong link between adaptive psychological processes, and
their being conducive to empirical accurate judgments. But the
links between empirical accuracy and adaptiveness are contro-
versial. While Gigerenzer et al. (1999) stress the adaptive value of
empirical accuracy, they also emphasize the importance of other
goods. In particular, inspired by Simon’s work on bounded ratio-
nality, and focusing on the cost of searching for information when
dealing with quite complex tasks, these scholars also stress the
adaptive importance of saving time and energy. This suggests
that links between accuracy and adaptiveness can be problema-
tized, and research on fast-and-frugal heuristics suggests that it
might not be adaptive to pay attention to empirical accuracy only.
Importantly, however, while Gigerenzer et al. (1999) claim that
the fast-and-frugal heuristics we use entail very small losses in
accuracy, other evidence does not sit well with the claim that
empirical accuracy is conducive to adaptive behavior. Convincing
cases have been made for the claim that empirical inaccuracy
might be evolutionarily adaptive (Haselton et al., 2009; McKay
and Dennett, 2009). But empirical inaccuracy may not only be
evolutionarily adaptive; it might also promote prudential goals
(Taylor, 1989) or epistemic goals (Vallinder and Olsson, 2014).
As we have seen, there may have been good reasons for
taking Hammond’s original concept of correspondence to be too
narrow and for some researchers attempting to extend its scope.
However, it is important to stress that these semantic changes
have led to confusion. It is true that conceptual change may be
part of scientiﬁc progress, but the problem here is that it is now
unclear what researchers really mean when they use the notion
of correspondence. Some scholars follow Hammond’s original
distinction, while others do not.
It is also unclear to which sorts of behavior and phenomena
correspondence might apply. Hammond and other scholars take
the notion of correspondence to apply solely to beliefs. As Stevens
(2008, p. 291) pointed out, “both criteria (coherence and corre-
spondence) apply to inferences; preferences, however, have no
correspondence criteria.” The underlying argument is the follow-
ing. You might ask, for instance, whether someone’s preferences
are transitive or not. But preferences cannot be assessed in terms
of empirical accuracy. In brief, only beliefs can be true of the real
world; desires and preferences cannot. Interestingly, however,
if there are multiple and diﬀerent correspondence criteria, it is
unclear why correspondence should apply solely to beliefs. The
idea that standards of accuracy might be applied to preferences
and desires as well is not new. Dennett (1987, p. 49), for example,
stressed that “a system’s desires are those it ought to have, given
its biological needs and the most practical means of satisfying
them.” But while it is true that empirical accuracy does not apply
preferences, other criteria of correspondence could apply to pref-
erences as well. This comes out quite clearly when we consider
the criterion of maximizing ﬁtness. Take, as an illustration, the
case of mate preferences. Evolutionary psychologists have inves-
tigated these at length (e.g., Buss, 1989; Kenrick and Keefe, 1992).
Mate preferences can aﬀect the current direction of sexual selec-
tion by inﬂuencing who is diﬀerently excluded; they may also
reﬂect prior selection pressures, and exert selective pressures
on other components. Preferences can vary in their degree of
adaptiveness.
Rule-Based and Goal-Based
Rationality
We now ﬁnd ourselves in a quandary. On the one hand, attempts
to reshape the notions of coherence and correspondence have led
to confusion in the literature. However, there seem to be sensi-
ble reasons to think that Hammond’s original concepts are too
narrow. How to remedy this predicament? In what follows, I
argue that a reframing of the debate is advisable.
Hammond’s original concepts of coherence and correspon-
dence have proven to be limited tools for organizing research on
judgment and decision-making, and scholars should not seek to
broaden such notions, but instead refrain from using them. In
fact, what underlies several current appeals to the coherence –
correspondence distinction seems to be best explained in terms
of a contrast between what I will dub rule-based and goal-based
rationality.
To support my conceptualization of this distinction, recall,
ﬁrst, that coherence is currently often interpreted as coherence
with some sets of rational norms. Moreover, correspondence
is often taken to encompass several goods and goals beyond
empirical accuracy. This seems to point to a contrast between
two diﬀerent approaches to the assessment of rational behavior
and cognition. One based on conformity with rational norms,
typically associated with consistency and the axioms of subjec-
tive probability theory and of rational choice, and one based
on the achievement of relevant goals and desirable outcomes.
In fact, some theorists have explicitly associated correspon-
dence with the achievement of a goal and stressed that relevant
goals “go beyond accuracy, frugality, and making fast deci-
sions” and “include transparency, group loyalty, and account-
ability” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 471). Moreover,
other scholars appealing to the coherence – correspondence
distinction have presented it as a “distinction between the assess-
ment of a process and the assessment of an outcome” (Lee
and Zhang, 2012, p. 366), where the contrast between assess-
ing an outcome and assessing a process resembles the contrast
between rule-based and goal-based rationality that I have just
introduced.
This contrast is not exhaustive. For instance, one could
assess behavior by focusing on intellectual virtues such as open-
mindedness and attentiveness. However, a contrast between
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rule-based and goal-based rationality seems to underlie other
binary distinctions made in the literature to highlight diﬀerences
between normative approaches. For instance, Evans and Over
(1996, p. 8) famously distinguished between personal rational-
ity (rationality 1) and impersonal rationality (rationality 2). They
characterize the former as thinking or “acting in a way that is
generally eﬃcient for achieving ones goals,” and the latter as
“thinking or acting when sanctioned by a normative theory.”
Moreover, Samuels et al. (2004) appealed instead to a distinction
between deontological and consequentialist approaches to ratio-
nal behavior. According to the deontologist, what it is to reason
correctly is to reason in accord with some appropriate set of rules
or principles, while another prominent view, often referred to as
consequentialism, maintains that what it is to reason correctly is
to reason in such a way that you are likely to attain certain goals
or outcomes. While these distinctions might present diﬀerences,
they revolve around a contrast between two diﬀerent questions:
is the organism following the relevant norm of rationality? Is the
organism achieving its goal?
I want to suggest here that debates over the nature of
rational judgment and decision-making can beneﬁt from being
reframed using the suggested distinction between rule-based and
goal-based rationality. Consider that, since the introduction of
Hammond’s original distinction, the number of diﬀerent research
programs concerned with rational judgment and decision has
grown rather than decreased. In this babel, ecological rationality
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999), grounded rationality (Elqayam, 2012),
rational analysis (Chater and Oaksford, 2000), and quantum
cognition (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013) have emerged as some
of the leading projects. Psychological research has traditionally
assessed both judgements and decisions against the so-called
“standard picture” (Stein, 1996, p. 4) of rationality, according
to which behavior should be assessed against rules of ﬁrst order
logic, probability theory, and expected utility theory (cf. Baron,
2004). Others have questioned whether we should take as bench-
marks of rationality classical principles of probability or whether
quantum probability is a viable alternative theory (Pothos and
Busemeyer, 2014).
However, other scholars concerned with the adaptiveness of
people’s behavior have questioned the very idea that behavior
and cognition should be assessed against some rational rules,
and emphasized instead that behavior has to be ultimately
assessed against goals. For instance, as we have already seen,
Gigerenzer et al. (1999, p. 364) stress that “ecological rational-
ity depends on decision- making that furthers an organisms
adaptive goals.” In this spirit, some researchers have argued
that violations of standard norms of rationality can lead not
only to grater empirical accuracy, speed and frugality – as
already suggested by research on fast-and-frugal heuristics –
but also to other goals, such as, for instance, accountabil-
ity (Lenton et al., 2013). But also advocates of other projects
have stressed the importance of goal attainment: according to
(Elqayam and Evans, 2011, pp. 236–237) “behavior typically
well adapted and conducive to people’s personal goals can be
described as rational.” An appeal to the importance of goals
has characterized the project of rational analysis too: Chater
and Oaksford (2000, p. 93) present their empirical program as
“attempting to explain why the cognitive system is adaptive,
with respect to its goals”, although they suggest that people’s
success at achieving goals is due to their following standard
rational principles. I suggest that scholars engaged in the “ratio-
nality debate” focus on my suggested distinction between rule-
based and goal-based rationality: this distinction helps to classify
and organize research on judgment and decision-making and
is a more useful conceptual framework than Hammond’s orig-
inal one, since key disagreements seem to rest upon whether
behavior has to be assessed against a set of rational norms
or against an organism’s relevant goals, and whether follow-
ing standard principles of rationality leads to the achievements
of goals. Moreover, while the contrast between rule-based and
goal-based rationality underlies other distinctions oﬀered in the
literature, such as that between personal and impersonal ratio-
nality, the labels of rule-based and goal-based rationality seem
to better capture the nature of the bones of contention between
diﬀerent projects in this literature that have been mentioned
above.
At the same time, my suggested distinction needs further
reﬁnement. For instance, caution is required when consider-
ing the perspective of goal-based rationality. According to this
view, to ask whether an organism’s behavior is rational means
to ask whether the organism’s goal is being achieved. However,
the notion of goal in contemporary psychology is not as clear
as one might want (cf. Castelfranchi, 2014, p. 105), and diﬀer-
ent research projects may conceptualize it diﬀerently. This is
not hair-splitting. For instance, the notion of rationality is
often applied to non-human animals as well (Stanovich, 2013;
Stevens and King, 2013), but it would then be important to
have a conceptualization of what it means to achieve a goal
or follow a rule that could be applied to non-human animals
too. Importantly, diﬀerent answers with regard to these issues
would point to quite diﬀerent perspectives on human rational-
ity. By identifying these open questions to address, it is then
possible to prompt theorists engaged in these debates to state
their commitments more clearly and to set the agenda for future
research.
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